greengrass67

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lock row. enjoy.

Great video. I was with you on the A10o call but decided to plug it in using a prize structure I pulled from a small $109 on stars.

4 considerations: the payout I pulled from a 100 runner tournament may be different than the one you played, I do not think HRC's min-raising range fits the villain's range snugly, your 3b range may be different (although given that 22 is only slightly winning and you see it as a given to 3b, I think it is a good enough approximation), and maybe most importantly, 3betting your premiums not-all-in would make a10o a much more profitable call for villain that the results spit out by HRC.

after reading your reply, I reread my message and felt it may come off as combative. My intention was the opposite, but the point may have been muddled in my excitement.

The points you make in the first paragraph of your response - I agree with these wholeheartedly. Forgive me for asking an abstract question, but I am trying to understand the consequences of equilibrium solution work at one point of the tree when other points were taken without an equilibrium approach. And stepping back, when you compare the bb/100 of differing bet sizes, and you determine (conclusively) that a pot sizing is x bb/100 better than a different sizing, what does this difference in bb/100 mean? Is it that this bet sizing is closer to equilibrium by that magnitude of x bb/100?

This may be too general, but what does it mean to be x bb/100 closer to equilibrium (if my previous statement is correct in its understanding) relative to a real winrate vs. opponents who are not at equilibrium? The opponent piosolver assumes plays the flop in equilibrium (correct?); how do we translate these findings to opponents who do not play equilibrium at this decision point?

Thank you for the great video.

perfect

What is your view on the consequences of comparing solutions in an equilibrium framework for this specific point in the game tree when previous decisions, such as the hero's and villain's preflop range construction (as well as the assumption that villain has no leading range), are not at equilibrium?

If we grant that the hand was not played in equilibrium up to the flop, what is the integrity of analyzing the flop decisions through an equilibrium lens? And if we were to continue the analysis for future decisions in the branches in which villain does not fold, would we continue to use an equilibrium solution approach or would we revert back to making assumptions that are non-equilibrium-based?

great video - the situations you saw were really interesting and I appreciated your analysis.

agree with your take on QQ hand. one thought - I think villain's bluffing frequency is higher than usual given stack sizes. after being checked to 3 times bvb and a pot that is roughly 40% of his stack lying there in the middle for the taking, he is betting nearly 100% of the time here.

edit: think the AJos hand that you plugged into ICMIZER goes to show how much assumptions matter for ICM calcs. if you just expanded calling ranges down to 88 from 99 for the smaller stacks you would get a -ev result. The logic continues even further, i.e. if there is 1 person on the table who is calling with 55+ because they either do not know about the ICM implications or just don't care about it your shove becomes -ev. With blockers and how nutted a min raise looks UTG off your stack size, I think raise folding is best (except to the shortest stack), esp since the BB has less than 10BB and is unlikely to defend as wide.

Also, even if the play is breakeven, if you believe you have a skill advantage vs. the table, why increase your variance?

edit2: the one thing though that is a huge plus to taking this spot is that you are about to pass through the blinds and get right at 10BB if you do not shove this hand, which reduces fold equity in future reshove spots.

nit

you can find your pokertracker code in your email - it's sent with the order receipt.

Thanks for the series. You mention at the end that you size cbets in situations with a sidepot as a % of the side pot (for instance, as you mention, a third). I feel like that ignores the equity you have in the main pot; specifically, it ignores the fact that your equity in the the main pot increases if the player still in the hand folds to your cbet.

To illustrate, the most extreme case would be something such as a main pot of 10k chips with a sidepot of 1000 chips. In this scenario, and I am sure that people intuitively realize this in the moment they see this contrast, betting 33% of 1000 is obviously very rarely ideal.

Combined with the opponent's folding frequency being related to the size of one's cbet, wouldn't it make sense to do a hybrid sizing somewhere between a % of the side pot and a % of the side pot + main pot?

Thanks for this.

Thanks for the video - at around the 24:00 minute mark you expect nismo jiz to shove j10os and then remark that he 'doesn't' like money' after seeing him fold. I was a bit surprised so I ran it roughly through hold'em resources calculator (with the payouts you showed at the beginning).

Result: http://i.imgur.com/0CdM2W0.png

So nash-wise it is dead-break even (with the caveat that even shipping AA with his stack nets him only +0.92). Do you think people are calling a shove like this tighter than nash given the monetary size of the final table? And is it a correct assumption that if people are calling tighter than nash, the profitability of a shove like j10os is higher than what is calculated by hold'em resources?

edit: such a sweet hand that last one. wp. the point about you just being able to go to town on the flop after he flats rather than shoves over your re-raise opened my eyes to postflop play in spots like this.

just wanted to say that if in an alternate universe every runitonce coach other than you stopped making videos tomorrow, I'd keep my sub.