every video by you is great but Ben.. really??
after waiting for you for so long, we're getting staking video?
there are many other people who can make videos about staking and noone would notice..
SAD :(
I haven't seen much of the information in this video presented in other places, so I disagree that other people have done so or could easily do so. I also disagree that "noone would notice" if a random pro made a video on staking instead of myself, for example I have more visibility than other pros and also some authority, and a lot of experience, all of which I think are important in the context of criticizing the norms of staking in the poker world (it's possible I'm misunderstanding your point due to the ambiguous phrasing).
It seems like you don't have an interest in the details of staking, and so this video wasn't helpful for you, but I think that's a bad reason to make an unconstructive negative post at the beginning of a discussion thread which is likely to stifle further constructive discussion regarding the content of the video.
Obviously English isnt my first language so sorry for poor phrasing.
I just wanted to say that I think you are the biggest factor in here that helps people understanding poker better and becoming better players.
I think people will benefit more from watching your theory vids / reviews / liveplays and not from knowing how to get staked and not get fckd.
Thanks Ben. My friend and I have been in a Tasmu deal for a couple of months for online tournament but we didn’t think about it nearly as much as you did we just said hey, I (the player) will put up 1k and friend (backer) will put up 1500, which I believe works out to 1.2 markup, and we split profits 50-50. Thoughts?
The most important details are the rate of growth of the bankroll and the stakes played, as well as the rate that money is taken out of the bankroll. I can't really comment further except to say that this isn't a TASMU deal, and isn't a makeup deal.
Vatal, the stakee only gets paid mark-up on the portion of stakee's action sold to the backer. So, at $5/$10, stakee sells backer 40% of action at 2bb/100. The mark-up is then (backer's share of action)(size of bb in $$)(size of mark-up in bb/100), or (40%)($10)(2)=$8.
The Tasmu deal seems overly complicated? Incentives are aligned (ie the stakee play his best poker even when deep in makeup) as long as he has some portion (significant given circumstances) of his own action ? Ie stakee has 20% of action in cash game, 50% is on the "stake" and backer has remaining 30% . Even deep in makeup the stakee will play to his best efforts. The only concern here is misreporting. Stakee hourly can still be higher "on deal" than "off deal". Im confused as to the significance of the backer paying bb/100 (except in cases where stakee would reject the deal as hourly lower in higher game which rarely happens as ususally bb<100 decreases slower than the proportional stake increase)? This just seems to lower his profit for backer?
Also interesting topic is the question of when should stakee and backer profit chop. Backer wants no chops as this avoids deep makeup and stakee wants more chops to lock up profits and "free roll" backer. Maybe a tiered payout structure such as 40% profits for first 10 buy ins , 50% for next 10 , 60% for next and so on aligns incentives. Thoughts on this?
CWAF, I think the problem with the structure you describe is that the stakee's hourly EV will vary a lot based on where they are in MU. Supposing stakee is out of MU, then they get ~50% of the profits from the 50% on stake, or ~25% of the profits. When they're deep in MU, they're getting only 20% of the EV from their share of the action. I suspect this will make motivation a problem. I agree that in this structure the stakee will not be incentivized to lose backer's money; but also recall that in makeup deals the stakee is incentivized to win money as well (to get out of MU and get profits) but that psychological and pragmatic factors predominate (it might take a long time to get out of MU, stakee might be broke in the meantime, they might hope to exhaust backer's patience), leading to stakee wanting to lose money in the real world. I think the negative psychological/pragmatic factors are still significant in this structure, but are less bad than in a traditional MU deal. The issues surrounding termination conditions and profit chopping also continue to exist.
My thoughts are that rather than making the perverse incentives in make-up deals less bad, we should do TASMU deals which make them go away entirely.
Is it fair to say a key problem for TASMU is precisely estimating win rate? This can make it difficult to apply to staking for live poker where sample sizes are so small and no one really knows what their true hourly is.
You don't have to estimate WR to do a TASMU deal, you only have to decide on a bb/100 markup to be paid. All you have to know for a TASMU deal is how WR scales by stake, and pay enough markup stakee wants to play bigger, but not so much markup backer is punting. In general, a fairly small mark-up is sufficient to accomplish this purpose.
Little complicated but interesting idea. I think a MU staking deal with a few adjustment can be good to solve the issues with the traditional system tho.
1.) performance based splits,this is where its 50/50 for the first x amount of $ then 60/40 for the next x etc
2.) Pre net winnings profit splits. This is for when stakee is in MU for example 25% of future in MU winnings will be split and 75% go's to paying of the MU. This insures that stakee get's paid for playing well. It will be easier to handle mentaly. Obv this only works with winning players. Lets say month 1 stakee is in debt, month 2 is a profitable month, for this month 25% of winning get split 50/50, and rest 75% go's to paying of the MU.
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every video by you is great but Ben.. really??
after waiting for you for so long, we're getting staking video?
there are many other people who can make videos about staking and noone would notice..
SAD :(
I haven't seen much of the information in this video presented in other places, so I disagree that other people have done so or could easily do so. I also disagree that "noone would notice" if a random pro made a video on staking instead of myself, for example I have more visibility than other pros and also some authority, and a lot of experience, all of which I think are important in the context of criticizing the norms of staking in the poker world (it's possible I'm misunderstanding your point due to the ambiguous phrasing).
It seems like you don't have an interest in the details of staking, and so this video wasn't helpful for you, but I think that's a bad reason to make an unconstructive negative post at the beginning of a discussion thread which is likely to stifle further constructive discussion regarding the content of the video.
Obviously English isnt my first language so sorry for poor phrasing.
I just wanted to say that I think you are the biggest factor in here that helps people understanding poker better and becoming better players.
I think people will benefit more from watching your theory vids / reviews / liveplays and not from knowing how to get staked and not get fckd.
Thanks Ben. My friend and I have been in a Tasmu deal for a couple of months for online tournament but we didn’t think about it nearly as much as you did we just said hey, I (the player) will put up 1k and friend (backer) will put up 1500, which I believe works out to 1.2 markup, and we split profits 50-50. Thoughts?
The most important details are the rate of growth of the bankroll and the stakes played, as well as the rate that money is taken out of the bankroll. I can't really comment further except to say that this isn't a TASMU deal, and isn't a makeup deal.
Staking is an important part of poker and occurs more than many would guess, especially as the stakes get higher and higher.
I am happy with this video.
i don't understand the reference to usury
brickster, it doesn't seem helpful for me to comment on details of the law that I don't understand well, and I'm not a lawyer.
Hello,
in your first 5/10 misalignment window example(47:36):
For the backer to lose money, the stakee's winrate should be less than 5bb/100(backer gets less than 0.4*5bb/100=2bb/100 while pays 2bb/100).
The stakee can profit while the backer loses money between -3.33bb/100(the stakee loses 0.6*3.33/100<2bb/100 while gets paid 2bb/100) and 5bb/100.
In your second 25/50, misalignment window example (51:57):
The stakee has 17% of his own action and gets paid 1bb/100 or 50$/100.
He he will be profitable if 0.17*x +50>0 ⇔ x>-294.1 or if his winrate is more than -294.1$/100 = -5.882bb/100.
The backer loses money if 0.83*y-50<0 ⇔ y< 60.2 or if the stakee's winrate is less than 60.2$/100 = 1.204bb/100.
So if the stakee "breakevens" at -5.882bb/100 the backer(who also pays 1bb/100) loses 5.882/100*0.83+1bb/100=5.88206bb/100 or 294.1$/100.
Cheers.
Vatal, the stakee only gets paid mark-up on the portion of stakee's action sold to the backer. So, at $5/$10, stakee sells backer 40% of action at 2bb/100. The mark-up is then (backer's share of action)(size of bb in $$)(size of mark-up in bb/100), or (40%)($10)(2)=$8.
The Tasmu deal seems overly complicated? Incentives are aligned (ie the stakee play his best poker even when deep in makeup) as long as he has some portion (significant given circumstances) of his own action ? Ie stakee has 20% of action in cash game, 50% is on the "stake" and backer has remaining 30% . Even deep in makeup the stakee will play to his best efforts. The only concern here is misreporting. Stakee hourly can still be higher "on deal" than "off deal". Im confused as to the significance of the backer paying bb/100 (except in cases where stakee would reject the deal as hourly lower in higher game which rarely happens as ususally bb<100 decreases slower than the proportional stake increase)? This just seems to lower his profit for backer?
Also interesting topic is the question of when should stakee and backer profit chop. Backer wants no chops as this avoids deep makeup and stakee wants more chops to lock up profits and "free roll" backer. Maybe a tiered payout structure such as 40% profits for first 10 buy ins , 50% for next 10 , 60% for next and so on aligns incentives. Thoughts on this?
CWAF, I think the problem with the structure you describe is that the stakee's hourly EV will vary a lot based on where they are in MU. Supposing stakee is out of MU, then they get ~50% of the profits from the 50% on stake, or ~25% of the profits. When they're deep in MU, they're getting only 20% of the EV from their share of the action. I suspect this will make motivation a problem. I agree that in this structure the stakee will not be incentivized to lose backer's money; but also recall that in makeup deals the stakee is incentivized to win money as well (to get out of MU and get profits) but that psychological and pragmatic factors predominate (it might take a long time to get out of MU, stakee might be broke in the meantime, they might hope to exhaust backer's patience), leading to stakee wanting to lose money in the real world. I think the negative psychological/pragmatic factors are still significant in this structure, but are less bad than in a traditional MU deal. The issues surrounding termination conditions and profit chopping also continue to exist.
My thoughts are that rather than making the perverse incentives in make-up deals less bad, we should do TASMU deals which make them go away entirely.
Is it fair to say a key problem for TASMU is precisely estimating win rate? This can make it difficult to apply to staking for live poker where sample sizes are so small and no one really knows what their true hourly is.
You don't have to estimate WR to do a TASMU deal, you only have to decide on a bb/100 markup to be paid. All you have to know for a TASMU deal is how WR scales by stake, and pay enough markup stakee wants to play bigger, but not so much markup backer is punting. In general, a fairly small mark-up is sufficient to accomplish this purpose.
GG NH
Little complicated but interesting idea. I think a MU staking deal with a few adjustment can be good to solve the issues with the traditional system tho.
1.) performance based splits,this is where its 50/50 for the first x amount of $ then 60/40 for the next x etc
2.) Pre net winnings profit splits. This is for when stakee is in MU for example 25% of future in MU winnings will be split and 75% go's to paying of the MU. This insures that stakee get's paid for playing well. It will be easier to handle mentaly. Obv this only works with winning players. Lets say month 1 stakee is in debt, month 2 is a profitable month, for this month 25% of winning get split 50/50, and rest 75% go's to paying of the MU.
"Wrong incentives produce wrong behavior,"
--far more often than many think.
Exceptionally important video-- good work!
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