Alright new Sauce video....oh no its about tournies.....oh well obviously some guys like tournies (personally I hate them, and I have a hard time playing them even when I get a free entry).
Ben, did you take a look into Future Game Simulation feature on HoldemResources Calculator ? It helps a bit to make the hypothesis of "not multiple hands" and positional awareness on ICM not so strong.
If possible when you are going to make the WCOOP High roller series taking a look into interesting hands you played before the FT would be also great.
This (FGS) takes into account the fact that we are UTG and we'll be posting the BB in the next hand, and therefore has us shoving wider. I don't know how it works exactly, but I'd assume that it doesn't take into accounts things like that if we obtain the chip lead then we're going to be able to apply more pressure.
I don't think any program does this Sauce stuff. It can be improved, as Chidwick said, using the equity of 77 vs shoving range and constructing the scenarios weighted by the likelihood of each one happening. I think this solves the only thing that is missing on it.
I haven't looked into the FGS algorithms yet, but I think it's likely they're stronger than ICM for the obvious reason that they address one of its assumptions.
The one flaw I see in this video (if we let the burger analogy slide) is the second bullet point on the "case study: calling with 77" page. Assuming we are still in the tournament with an 18bb stack every time we call entirely negates the worst part about calling the shove. In reality 42.7% of the time we will have busted the tournament the hand before and have zero +$EV shoves and 57.3% of the time we will be afforded this extra profitable opportunity the next hand, whereas if we fold we have a 100% chance of making it to the 23% profitable shove range the following hand. This has to be taken into account.
Another thing to think about is that if we are trying to find an equilibrium strategy that involves calling slightly -$EV hands to get the chiplead we also have to slightly diminish the value of having that chiplead since we will then get called slightly wider by the remaining players once we have it since they are playing the same strategy.
I look forward to seeing the video of the final table if that is coming up.
"The one flaw I see in this video (if we let the burger analogy slide) is the second bullet point on the "case study: calling with 77" page. Assuming we are still in the tournament with an 18bb stack every time we call entirely negates the worst part about calling the shove. In reality 42.7% of the time we will have busted the tournament the hand before and have zero +$EV shoves and 57.3% of the time we will be afforded this extra profitable opportunity the next hand, whereas if we fold we have a 100% chance of making it to the 23% profitable shove range the following hand. This has to be taken into account. "
The fact that we're moving from blind-->button in the subsequent hand is independent of the fact that a bigger stacksize increases our EV in subsequent hands (although both of these things occur together in my example). We could re run an importantly similar example in a situation where we moved from UTG to UTG+1 at a 9 handed table, and the stacksize point still holds, although it always has to be modified by the fact that our EV is greater than 0 at the poker table provided we aren't in the blinds. That we have a +EV opportunity next hand just means we need to set the threshold for shoving in the first hand relative to our opportunity cost of missing subsequent hands. If we meet our opportunity cost, then it's still better for us to gamble for the big stack provided that our opponents are all playing ICM tight, or nearly so. I realize this is kind of a tricky point, though, but my intention was to make the example as simple as possible.
I'll try and explain this another way because this first paragraph is reading pretty densely for me, heh. Ok, so within the ICM model we know that we aren't considering our EV in subsequent hands, and we all agree that this is an important assumption of ICM that isn't true of real poker (and crucially, in my hand example, we move from the worst position in the BB to the best OTB in the next hand). My point is just that ICM's ignorance of our position on the next hand is independent of its ignorance about our changing stacksize. So, to keep things independent, I measured the EV of our changing stacksize on the next hand by staying inside the ICM model, and measuring the number of +prize pool EV ICM shoves we have with the bigger stack versus the smaller stack. So, by keeping ICM's assumptions constant in both hand A and hand B, and measuring EVs from inside the ICM model, I thought we could zero in on the thing we want to measure which was ICM's ideas about the way stacksize influences the freq of +Prize EV shoves.
Another thing to think about is that if we are trying to find an equilibrium strategy that involves calling slightly -$EV hands to get the chiplead we also have to slightly diminish the value of having that chiplead since we will then get called slightly wider by the remaining players once we have it since they are playing the same strategy.
I agree, and I mentioned this in the video. My point is just that the equilibrium strategy is looser than ICM and tighter than CEV, I don't know exactly where.
So you disagree with calling 77s in that spot? I think it depends on table dynamics and how good the opponents are. So against two really good players I would gamble there, against players that aren't that good not worth the gamble.
If we are all evenly matched players I like the call. Against the button's 43.5% shove we have around 56% equity. So 56% of time we will have a stranglehold on the match and probably win.
According to ICM... if we win that hand our chances of winning the tournament go up to 50%. (5btn 14sb(us) 9bb).
In such scenario when you have a medium stack very few hands are actually just slightly -EV, most are very -EV, so this doesn't change much in calling ranges. ICM pressure is very high and (big stack push range % / medium stack call range %) ratio is simply huge.
Stephen beat me to it. 77 study seems wrong to me. Your 80+% figure of EV shoves has to be weighted against EV we lose if we bust. Also comparing % of hands that have +EV shoves or calls is probably meaningless, we have to compare sums of all EVs of all hands we shove.
I think your points will be easier to understand if you distinguish the times when you're talking within the ICM model from the times you're talking outside of it.
cYde10 years, 5 months agoI guess enzyne is saying that you didn't account for the times when we call with 77 and lose. In that case we can neither shove 85,8% nor the 23% if we fold but 0% because we busted out of the tournament. I don't see where this outcome is weight into your argument. It's the same issue that Stephen brought up and I wasn't able to understand your answer if you have already explained it. Sauce12310 years, 5 months agoCyde,
Because I'm measuring the EV of the 77 call within the ICM model, the model naturally takes into account the times we call 77 and lose.
Ben, ICM based analysis of single hand doesn't really consider bust probability and its implications. They can be achieved through some serious mental modeling only.
When you call there is a ~50% chance that tournament ends right here, and upcoming hands won't give you any opportunity to continue making +EV decisions hand after hand. In another 50% of cases you double up and continue tournament in a new scenario - as a big stack where chips flow in your direction.
When you shove bust probability is much lower pretty much always, so by continiously pushing you can accumulate +EV hands one by one and improve your tournament result.
This dynamic is pretty much outside of ICM single-handed scope, but it has to be considered when you are contemplating a ~0% EV call.
For example, in HU sng if opponent pushes first hand and you make a slightly +EV call, tournament can end immediately and you will be negative cause of rake being > than +EV call you made. So you can choose to pass some scenarios which have high probability of bust scenario in order to even have a chance to accumulate enough +EV decisions during tournament to beat rake.
"Right, but irrespective of the EV you are analysing the future implications of the call under the assumption we win every time, no?"
Yes, but it doesn't matter. Just imagine for a second we're playing an imaginary poker game where position doesn't matter (like stud, with its ante/bring structure). In this imaginary game we know calling in hand A is worth 0. If we fold we get X% +$EV plays on hand B, and if we call we get some additional number of +$EV plays on hand B. So we should call in hand A.
The blind structure complicates things slightly and forces us to weight positional considerations against stack considerations, but it's useful (for me at least) to separate these two points in theory.
There is no need for such distinction. When we talk about frequency of +EV shoves, we naturally mean ICM, that's how we calculate EV.
I think you are wrong in assuming "ICM ignorance of our changing stack size". In fact, stack size is the only thing ICM is taking in consideration. In other words, when we "gamble" and double up, our probability to finish first goes up, and probability of our opponents to finish first goes down, so ICM does take next hand in consideration in that regard. The changing of stacks as a result of all in is the main reason we have more +ICM EV shoves if we win.
My point is, when you calculate ICM EV, you have already taken into account the possibility of doubling up/crippling your opponent.
Also, your implication that
EV(subsequent hands if we win) - EV(we lose if we bust) > EV(subsequent hands if we fold now)
is completely not obvious. In fact, I think if we calculate EV using ICM they are equal. (or, strictly speaking, - 0.04 of prize pool in your example)
I used 6 future hands in the FGS simulations. The most I could use before calculations became too heavy. My computer is a beast, but trying 9 hands choked it. :-)
Really good video! Made me think about situations where I should be gambling or folding. Think a large part of it depends on the edge we have on our opponents, or the edge they have on us. If I am against two RIO pros I will gamble and call with 77s, against two cardrunner pros I will fold there, since I have a huge edge.
"Raise KJos in CO". How can we figure out if this is a profitable play or not? Usually I will just look at villian's "fold to LP %" "vpip" and make my decision off that. How can I make a better decision using a holdem resource? Is the tool called "Holdem resources model"?
Responding to Stevie and other's saying Ben isn't considering the times we bust.
Calling 77 is neutral EV according to ICM or more formally
A weighted average of ICMV( call and lose ) + ICMV(Call and chop) + ICMV(Call and win) = 0
Sauce's variation on the model is holds everything the same, except term 3 becomes larger because we can shove 85% OTB the next hand.
So the EV of calling 77
A weighted average of ICM(V call and lose ) + ICMV(Call and chop) + ICMV(Call and win) + PrizepoolEV of having a big stack > 0
This is a good video and really gets to why modelling these situations are really tough and unfortunately for tournament players is often something they must attempt to while they are playing the highest stakes they usually play.
I think Ben outlined why we should call 77 vs that BTN shoving range, but it's a constant balancing act because if we call 77 BTN should shove a little tighter and then we need to call tighter. Especially because if we can only play 8% of hands vs. a shove we likely have a substantial CEV loss rate. Given that stack sizes remain similarly distributed the $EV of folding isn't the $EV of our stack after folding but the $EV of our stack minus our expected loss rate times the number of hands we expect to play at this stack size.
Thanks for putting it in those words that make it a lot easier to understand, I was having trouble agreeing with what Ben was saying and really siding on Stephens side with the idea that he wasnt accounting for the times we bust. This does leave me wondering though, does this mean that everytime we are put in a neutral EV spot we should always go with it (using this particular 3 handed example)? If not, could you please give an example using these parameters. Thank you
"Thanks for putting it in those words that make it a lot easier to understand, I was having trouble agreeing with what Ben was saying and really siding on Stephens side with the idea that he wasnt accounting for the times we bust. This does leave me wondering though, does this mean that everytime we are put in a neutral EV spot we should always go with it (using this particular 3 handed example)? If not, could you please give an example using these parameters. Thank you"
The answer depends on what you mean by the bolded bit. If by "neutral EV spot" you mean a spot that an ICM model like HRC defines as prize pool neutral, then probably yes.
"Given that stack sizes remain similarly distributed the $EV of folding isn't the $EV of our stack after folding but the $EV of our stack minus our expected loss rate times the number of hands we expect to play at this stack size."
Agreed. Although, it's very difficult to model the expected number of hands we get at this stack distribution, as well as other similarly bad -CEV stack distributions. Because it's so hard to model the stack implications of future hands, I think it's better to default to what people's goals seem to be with their stacksize and tournament life. Statements like "he's trying to move up the ladder" or "he's playing for the win" or any of the gradations between them actually make a lot of sense in this context and figuring out people's intentions can help us fill in the gaps in our models (which typically only work in a vacuum, or over a small number of hands).
Maybe your life is easier, my brain is experiencing technical difficulties on last sentence
Given that stack sizes remain similarly distributed the $EV of folding isn't the $EV of our stack after folding but the $EV of our stack minus our expected loss rate times the number of hands we expect to play at this stack size.
:S PS /All rest is perfect tho :)) i just gave trouble / difficulty understanding exactly last sentence
I think something your 77 example is ignoring is Bust Probability - two hands with equal ICMadjusted-$EV values can have different probabilities of busting. As an example I'm looking at an SB call vs BTN shove situation and both A8s and KQs have identical ICM-$EV of -0.21 but the probability of bust is 47.06% and 49.75% respectively.
I believe the factor to consider is the POB - and that happens to track closely with ICM$EV but that's just a lucky coincidence for your purposes.
You can use ICMIZER [XX detailed result] button (in the Result tab) to see the POB of a given hand.
I could very well be wrong. What do you think?
Edit: just realized this doesn't work for when we can't bust (have stack covered) - so what I said must be wrong - but POB still must be a factor.
I think you are correct. The real question, how exactly to consider POB in such scenario. If we win, we get a lot of push possibilities with low bust probability. If we fold, we continue to get pushed at and at some point we will have to make a call with high bust probability.
Soo.. why not now? If we wait a few hands, our double up will get us back to medium stack and won't grant us chances to make +EV pushes with low bust probability as big stack, thats for sure.
I wrote an article about related problem here: http://www.icmpoker.com/en/articles/icm-poker-and-ultimate-difference-between-call-and-push-spots/
I am not sure I fully understand everything you're saying but I think I get the gist. My issue is that you are looking at an $EV problem through a cEV lens and ignoring the fact that in the 2nd hand folding the button is going to be inherently +$EV...we don't have to be shoving to gain equity in the hand and in fact if we isolate the second hand we have a greater increase in prize pool equity in the 9bb/12bb/7bb scenario than we do in the 18bb/3bb/7bb one. I think using our shove range as a barometer for our future profitability is a misleading oversimplification.
I definitely agree that folding OTB (in a non ante structure) is going to be +$EV for the same reasons you do.
Like I said in my prior post, I was just doing a thought experiment to show that ICM is self contradictory if we compare it against itself over multiple hands. I'm definitely not making precise recommendations about optimal play (optimal here meaning in a broader than ICM context) in the sng spots I was describing. For instance, I still don't know whether calling 77 is optimal in the toy sng I described in the video, but I do think the example shows that if our opponents are playing ICM then it's likely a call.
It's funny, HRC doesn't show the $EV of folding- it just shows how +$EV it is to call or raise. So the ICM models don't allows us to quantify the opportunity cost (relative to folding) of making really thin +$EV jams or calls. Thanks for pointing this out, and it's another reason why our current models aren't as accurate as we'd like.
Ben, ICMIZER does show $EV of folding - and both use $EV_fold to find the results they give. If you get a result of +0.03 that is it's EV compared to folding.
Nice video. Looking forward to seeing the tournament footage.
"Chips we lose are more valuable than chips we win". This makes intuitive sense for the early or middle stages of a tournament and for playing with a short stack. Does this still hold true when winning includes both gaining chips and moving up in the prize structure? For example, at the final table of an MTT with four players remaining and a big stack (100bb) vs short stack (10bb) confrontation, does the big stack still lose more and win less?
Unless there is some anomality in payout structure this statement usually holds true. But of course, if someone has 1 chip and if you bust him from tournament your minimal payout increases, winning this 1 chip from this particular player is very valuable and losing 1 chip to another player is not so valuable.
So busting a player with stack of X chips is not the same as winning X chips from big stack, for example.
Usually, yes. Take for example an MTT structure fairly early in the money. Maybe 10% of the prize pool will have been payed out for mincashes already, so the chips we win don't sum to the value of the full prizepool, and so they're worth less.
Yes, the think is that by playing smaller pots we put less chips in the pot in average and this is important in a FT. I am talking with an average stack of 40bb or so.
By limping we don't let the oponents that CC with position (BTN, CO, MP) put presure on us by betting often with position and apply pressure to us since we will play with much bigger SPR (stack per pot ratio). (We are going to have to check-fold the flop often in this situation, which will occur often).
You have to take in count that when our stack gets down from 20-25bb (when he would bet turn/river) our BF is huge and we would have to fold very often.
Question 2: Besides of that, do you think the EV of limping in EP-MP has similar EV to Open Raising in a normal tournament or cash scenario? (without ICM considerations)
Interesting that you bring this up. Usually people that limp are thought to be weak players or fishes. It seems some people have been changing their views and limping is a viable strategy.
I'm hesitant to pursue this topic further here because I find myself disagreeing with how you're framing the discussion. Limping isn't a magic bullet, it's just a cheaper way to put money in the pot. It isn't better or worse (either CEV-wise or ICM-wise) than raising. I think limping can be a strong choice either as a pure or mixed strategy, especially from EP and MP, and especially as the antes get larger.
Ben, do you think in a FT where do you have a huge edge with a lot of weak players it would be better to limp in general than to raise first in? This makes the pots size smaller and pays out more your postflop skills (where you are much better than then).
Hi Ben, Thank you for a wonderful video which I am continuing to digest. I come from a different background than your average ROI subscriber I think, as I am substantially older and play live tournaments largely (as well as cash). I have a question regarding the fields I typically play against, which I believe to be largely ICM naive in my experience. In these situations, assuming your theoretical example where we are the chip leader, should our button shoving ranges be closer to CEV ranges as opposed to ICM ranges? As you mention, it is a disaster to get called as a chip leader in this case, but we shove wider because we are protected by SB, and BB's tight calling ranges. With the opponents I face in these situations being less aware of ICM considerations and perhaps more likely to call, does this erode my level of protection?
Thanks again, and forgive me if this is elementary, but I very much enjoy your videos.
Sauce12310 years, 5 months agoThanks Jeff, I'm glad you're enjoying the videos, particularly since you come from a different background than us online grinders, and I'm eager to hear the input of everyone on this subject.
I think in your ICM-naive fields (where players are playing too close to CEV when ICM considerations are important) the right adjustment is to play even tighter than ICM suggests. Suppose folding has a +EV of some amount in ICM play, well, if your opponents are shoving and calling much looser then that +EV from folding increases, and it takes a larger +EV to enter the pot (or to put it differently, the opportunity cost of entering pots increases when your opponents are naive about ICM).
Hey Ben - cool vid. I'm strictly a cash player, and had the same question as Jeff when looking at your examples.
Okay, so clearly we should open less than ICM suggests against players who call too much. How do we quantify this, though? (i.e. in the example where we open 42%, and the blinds can only call 8% according to ICM- let's say one is calling 10%, and the other 35%, or whatever- what's the best way to go about figuring out exactly how much we should loosen up our range- or at least to improve our estimate of this?
In the 77 example it seems very intuitive that calling would be better although FoldEV next hand is not 0 and being able to play higher vpip doesnt mean more $, like in sats there are spots where is optimal for big stack to shove any2 but this doesnt rly increasy his $ev
(it was ask before but still) Do you think/let`s say on a final table/ given stack sizes we could vary our preflop strategy in some spots by like only limping/only 2x/ only >2.5x ? I think in theory it should be relevant even to our flop cbet strategy (for example). Another thing is betsizing on the river - lets say u r the smaller stack and pot is big compared to stack and the spot is such as that in a cash game ur sizing should be all in but now if u go all in as the shorter stack on FT (it seems to me) u should have less bluff than in a cash game and villain should be overfolding to some extend to make the equilibrium(so less ev, so smaller betsizing could be better)./but then 'the caller' should be making -ev calls?/ (and the opposite - if u are the bigger stack u could have more bluffs than in a cash game- /no contradiction here/)
Thanks for the comment, and I'm glad the video got you thinking about these topics. Because of your English I'm not 100% clear on your post, but I think I'm following you. I'm going to summarize your points first just to be sure I'm understanding you. It seems like you've made what I think are a couple very important points.
@your 77 point. In the 77 hand it seems clear that the additional shoves contribute substantially to the big stack's EV. HRC highlights the shoves in green, and they seem to be distributed gradually from near neutral EV to fairly +EV, depending on the strength of the jammer's hand both AI and as blockers to calling ranges. It seems like when you sum all of the additional hands button gets to shove when he's the bigstack that the cumulative effect of all the shoves is going to be large. It would be interesting to see this effect quantified though, and I haven't done it yet. Intuitively though, it seems like a very large effect.
@your postflop ICM points. If I'm taking your meaning here, you're arguing that ICM doesn't just effect the preflop equilibrium, it continues to effect the postflop equilibrium. Specifically, the bettor gets to either a) bluff more than CEV equilibrium, b) the caller calls less than CEV equilibrium, or c) some combinations of both. My guess is that the answer here is (c), that when ICM considerations are in play, the guy doing the betting bluffs a little more often than CEV and the caller calls a little less.
Ok, so let's compare an ICM toygame to a CEV toygame in order to formalize this hypothesis a bit (throughout this part, numbers with a $ before them are prize pool numbers and unadorned numbers are chips). What we'll need is a prize structure and some stacks in order to model the ICM part, and we'll need a simple CEV situation in order to model the CEV equilibrium. So let's suppose then that we're 3 handed with prizes $3/$2/$1 and stacks are 15/15/15, and we arrive hu on the river in a polarized nuts or air situation with a potsize of 10 and effective stacks of 10. The CEV solution is for the bettor to bet his bluffs and half his air, and his EV is .75 of the pot, and for the caller to call half of his bluffcatchers. It seems like either player can unilaterally increase their EV in the ICM case: the caller by folding all the time and the bettor by either never bluffing or always bluffing. But let's test this idea first. Suppose the bluffer bets pot, half the time he busts and wins $1, and the other half the time he wins 10 for a stack of 20. His $EV prior to the hand is $2. If he bluffs and wins then his EV after the hand (according to ICMizer) is $2.23, and he has 44% of the chips in play. We can compare his fraction of the prize pool to his fraction of the total chips, in this case his fraction of the pool is 2.23/6 or 37%, which is only 84% as valuable as the CEV of 44%. Or, in other words, for his call to be "equal" to CEV, it has to be worth .44/.37, or 119% of CEV. In this case the pot is 10, so his call needs to have an EV of >= to .19(10) or around 1.9 out of the 10 pot (I think?).<--- This last move seems kinda sketchy to me, but I'm about to go to sleep and I can't be bothered to fix it up right now, someone let me know what I did wrong later :)
If that's right (in principle if not in execution) we can probably solve for thresholds for bluff success for the bettor and then come to an ICM adjusted equilibrium. Because of the inadequacies with the ICM model I don't really think it's necessary for me to follow this train of thought all the way to a workable model (although if someone does want to explore this it'd be interesting to see the results!), but I think this thought experiment works as a sketch of how the equilibria in ICM spots get wacky compared with CEV.
So... how to use this information ? I donno, that's another video or three.
I fully agree with your points. I was thinking the same thing about the bluff success threshhold( havent looked the exact numbers tho).
But also i have 1 more point- if it is true that icm affects different stack sizes in a diff.way (mb thats an illusion) there will be some spots where there is no/strange equilibrium.
Let`s say- 3 players, stacks A-50chips /B-15/C-15 (prizepool 3/2/1) and hand is between players A and C and pot on the river is 10 (C has 10 left) and C is with polarized range. So, to shove on bluff he risks tournament chips and busting so A could overfold. This means C could bluff more and normally(!) there would be equilibrium when C should bluff X% and A should call Y%.
X1 over 33%
Y1 under 50%
But mb A(reasons-even if he loses he is chipleader and some intuitive things like this) is less affected from icm than C, so he would start making some +chipEV calls that are ok in$EV for him but will make C' bluff losing $EV(for C).
So the equilibrium would be connected to:
X1 / Y1 = Z1 X2 / Y2 = Z2
Z1 > Z2
So this would decrease shortstack's EV (in general in this spot) compared to cash game model or ICM with equal stacks model even when he is the bettor.
Your argument makes perfect sense to me. There's a similar effect reflected in the HRC outputs I look at in following videos (although these only work for preflop). I compared a raise/fold tree without ICM to a raise/fold tree with ICM (and in the ICM tree I inputted the stacks and positions from hand 1 of my tournament review where I'm the big stack in the CO), and the equilibrium reflects the fact that the big stack can overbluff by opening much more often and 3betting much more often than the other players, and the once the big stack has VPIP-ed or failed to VPIP the other player's play changes a lot.
I'll definitely check out this effect in a later part of the final table review, I think it should show up in the HRC calculations. We can find the effect's magnitude by looking at an ICM sim where Z1>Z2 and comparing it to one where Z2>Z1. I was also informed that CREV has a tournament mode which might take these ICM adjusted equilibria into effect for hu pots.
got a questions about FGS, so ill post it here. Imagine table of 5 players with 3 itm spots, all stacks are almost even. Small blind jams and we're on the BB. Now the Qs:
1) If we call and win, we're gonna have massive winrate, right?
2) Does FGS consider this and then widens our calling range in the 5 player bvb situation?
I'd say it depends on the size of blinds and average stacks? As I understand it, FGS takes into account the next (or next few) hands of play. If the blinds are still a small percentage of stacks, people aren't really going to be jamming/calling off wide. The higher the blinds, the more stacks should be going in the next hands and so the more FGS should be considered.
I'd seriously suggest toying around with FGS on Icmizer with different stack sizes for the example in your question. You'll get more out of that than any general answers people can give you. The real question is exactly how much should you be widening your range in that spot and that obviously depends on your opponent's jamming range and the blinds/stack sizes, and how will people be playing in the next few hands.
also @zenfish, did you put in same btn openjam ranges for ICM and FGS for the sake of the argument? because hrc automaticlly finds the equilibrium doesnt it?
Sorry to be the dim kid in the class and to take the discussion back to fundamentals with this question:
Whenever I read or hear something about ICM I'm always told that chips we lose are worth more than chips we gain. How can that be the case if ICM attempts to put a value on each chip in play and in the situation where I lose a pot but am not eliminated the total number of chips in play remains the same?
I'm not sure how to answer your question in a clearer way than I've already tried to present this information in the video. I do think this is a tricky concept though, and I'm not sure I understand it fully either.
I think it might be clearer if you just do an example on your own, similar to the one I had in the video. It's probably easier to just do the math than to explain.
Thanks for your response. I've been having a think about the question I asked and I might have already figured it out (please confirm if you think I have got it right): ICM doesn't attempt to assign a value to each chip - it attempts to assign a value to your stack. Therefore you can lose chips in a pot and lose value from your stack but not in proportion to the number of chips lost. e.g. if you are in last place in a tournament, but already in the money, and lose 20% of your stack, the value of your stack doesn't diminish by 20%.
I believe there is another approximation in the ICM model, it's that the frequency of finishing at a given position is considered to be independent of the prize structure.
For example, if I'm the only shortstack of the table at the bubble, I will finish last more often than at a winner takes all tournament with similar stack sizes; because in the first case it is the correct play for the other players to wait for me to bust before fighting each other. But in the ICM calculations I have the same chances of finishing last in both cases, since this is calculated only based on stack sizes. If this was properly taken into account by the model it could change the results quite a bit... Am I wrong?
I think your argument is right, but I think the approximation you're talking about is the same, or closely related to, the ones that I talked about in the video. In other words, you're saying correct strategy leads to different finish % then the ICM model predicts so it's incomplete, and I'm describing some of the strategy changes that must be correct if the ICM model is right but if those changes are right then the ICM model is wrong.
One assumption (that you highlighted) is that ICM assumes your opponents are calling correctly according to ICM. This seems to be brushed over rather swiftly by most discussions on ICM that I have seen. I believe it should play a far bigger part in one's decision making process.
At mid-stakes, where I play, it is fair to say that a very decent proportion of players aren't doing this. So in your shallow stack 3 handed example (a situation that will b every familiar to most players, particularly in turbos). Given the huge advantage having 12x vs 7x and 8x is I think it is incorrect to be shoving the 80 odd % on the BTN that ICM tells us we should be. Obviously this all depend on your reads of your opponents' goals and understanding of the game.
While my explanation wont be anywhere near as clear as yours are; this leads me, in general, to be tighter than ICM when shoving with CL at stacks this shallow.
Hold em Resources Calculator has a utility that lets you define your opponent's shoving ranges and then finds the correct strategy to maximize $EV. It sounds like this tool might help you take better advantage of your opponent's play.
In the 77 example, isn't the problem really with the algorithm we're using and it's possible that if we used an ICM algorithm that gave a higher frequency of the big stack finishing first compared to Mason-Harville, that we could call with 77, because we would be less concerned about busting third than we would be in Mason-Harville?
I think this kind of argument is circular. Sure, there exists some algorithm that could output really accurate results, but the devil is in the details :p
Well, you seem to be assuming that Mason-Harville doesn't give sufficient weight to the advantage of having a big stack. I don't know why I should be convinced that 77's a clear call here just because it's on the border of being $EV according to this model. Yes, there is value in doubling up and Mason-Harville just like any other ICM model takes that into account because larger stacks have higher $EV. You seem to be suggesting that there is an inherent problem with ICM because it cannot take into account things like big stack bully advantage whereas empirically if we can prove that folding 77 here is bad, we would need to tinker with the algorithm to assign greater first place finish frequency to largest stack.
Well, you seem to be assuming that Mason-Harville doesn't give sufficient weight to the advantage of having a big stack. I don't know why I should be convinced that 77's a clear call here just because it's on the border of being $EV according to this model. Yes, there is value in doubling up and Mason-Harville just like any other ICM model takes that into account because larger stacks have higher $EV. You seem to be suggesting that there is an inherent problem with ICM because it cannot take into account things like big stack bully advantage whereas empirically if we can prove that folding 77 here is bad, we would need to tinker with the algorithm to assign greater first place finish frequency to largest stack.
I don't know if I understood you correctly but You seem to say thay you have to be more loose than Malmuth-Harville model predicts when calling All inns, but when you are the big stack this is probably not true, because by winning you not change you're expected EV gain of shoving future hand much and when you loose you're diminishing substantially the expectation of shoving future hands.
Shouldn't the input for the SB in the "didn't take the gamble with 77" slide be 11.5 and not 8.5? I would assume that if i'm correct would change what your shove range should be.
[How] does this account for the times that we fold and in a subsequent hand the other short stack busts? We would not have been alive to increase our payout had we called and lost.
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Liking before watching :D
Just upgraded to Pro Elite. Liking what I am seeing already
Alright new Sauce video....oh no its about tournies.....oh well obviously some guys like tournies (personally I hate them, and I have a hard time playing them even when I get a free entry).
Just started to play MTTs, so impeccable timing! :-) Going to enjoy this thoroughly.
This should be useful to us MTT noobs who want to dabble in the WCOOP :)
This video is awesome. Thank you.
Ben, did you take a look into Future Game Simulation feature on HoldemResources Calculator ? It helps a bit to make the hypothesis of "not multiple hands" and positional awareness on ICM not so strong.
If possible when you are going to make the WCOOP High roller series taking a look into interesting hands you played before the FT would be also great.
This (FGS) takes into account the fact that we are UTG and we'll be posting the BB in the next hand, and therefore has us shoving wider. I don't know how it works exactly, but I'd assume that it doesn't take into accounts things like that if we obtain the chip lead then we're going to be able to apply more pressure.
Interview with the HRC creator in which he talks about FGS
I don't think any program does this Sauce stuff. It can be improved, as Chidwick said, using the equity of 77 vs shoving range and constructing the scenarios weighted by the likelihood of each one happening. I think this solves the only thing that is missing on it.
I haven't looked into the FGS algorithms yet, but I think it's likely they're stronger than ICM for the obvious reason that they address one of its assumptions.
Hey Ben,
The one flaw I see in this video (if we let the burger analogy slide) is the second bullet point on the "case study: calling with 77" page. Assuming we are still in the tournament with an 18bb stack every time we call entirely negates the worst part about calling the shove. In reality 42.7% of the time we will have busted the tournament the hand before and have zero +$EV shoves and 57.3% of the time we will be afforded this extra profitable opportunity the next hand, whereas if we fold we have a 100% chance of making it to the 23% profitable shove range the following hand. This has to be taken into account.
Another thing to think about is that if we are trying to find an equilibrium strategy that involves calling slightly -$EV hands to get the chiplead we also have to slightly diminish the value of having that chiplead since we will then get called slightly wider by the remaining players once we have it since they are playing the same strategy.
I look forward to seeing the video of the final table if that is coming up.
Hey Stephen,
"The one flaw I see in this video (if we let the burger analogy slide) is the second bullet point on the "case study: calling with 77" page. Assuming we are still in the tournament with an 18bb stack every time we call entirely negates the worst part about calling the shove. In reality 42.7% of the time we will have busted the tournament the hand before and have zero +$EV shoves and 57.3% of the time we will be afforded this extra profitable opportunity the next hand, whereas if we fold we have a 100% chance of making it to the 23% profitable shove range the following hand. This has to be taken into account. "
The fact that we're moving from blind-->button in the subsequent hand is independent of the fact that a bigger stacksize increases our EV in subsequent hands (although both of these things occur together in my example). We could re run an importantly similar example in a situation where we moved from UTG to UTG+1 at a 9 handed table, and the stacksize point still holds, although it always has to be modified by the fact that our EV is greater than 0 at the poker table provided we aren't in the blinds. That we have a +EV opportunity next hand just means we need to set the threshold for shoving in the first hand relative to our opportunity cost of missing subsequent hands. If we meet our opportunity cost, then it's still better for us to gamble for the big stack provided that our opponents are all playing ICM tight, or nearly so. I realize this is kind of a tricky point, though, but my intention was to make the example as simple as possible.
I'll try and explain this another way because this first paragraph is reading pretty densely for me, heh. Ok, so within the ICM model we know that we aren't considering our EV in subsequent hands, and we all agree that this is an important assumption of ICM that isn't true of real poker (and crucially, in my hand example, we move from the worst position in the BB to the best OTB in the next hand). My point is just that ICM's ignorance of our position on the next hand is independent of its ignorance about our changing stacksize. So, to keep things independent, I measured the EV of our changing stacksize on the next hand by staying inside the ICM model, and measuring the number of +prize pool EV ICM shoves we have with the bigger stack versus the smaller stack. So, by keeping ICM's assumptions constant in both hand A and hand B, and measuring EVs from inside the ICM model, I thought we could zero in on the thing we want to measure which was ICM's ideas about the way stacksize influences the freq of +Prize EV shoves.
Another thing to think about is that if we are trying to find an equilibrium strategy that involves calling slightly -$EV hands to get the chiplead we also have to slightly diminish the value of having that chiplead since we will then get called slightly wider by the remaining players once we have it since they are playing the same strategy.
I agree, and I mentioned this in the video. My point is just that the equilibrium strategy is looser than ICM and tighter than CEV, I don't know exactly where.
Stephen,
So you disagree with calling 77s in that spot? I think it depends on table dynamics and how good the opponents are. So against two really good players I would gamble there, against players that aren't that good not worth the gamble.
If we are all evenly matched players I like the call. Against the button's 43.5% shove we have around 56% equity. So 56% of time we will have a stranglehold on the match and probably win.
According to ICM... if we win that hand our chances of winning the tournament go up to 50%. (5btn 14sb(us) 9bb).
In such scenario when you have a medium stack very few hands are actually just slightly -EV, most are very -EV, so this doesn't change much in calling ranges. ICM pressure is very high and (big stack push range % / medium stack call range %) ratio is simply huge.
Could you PLEASE make a non satty SNG vid, discussing your views on ICM and and ChipEV, would be really really interesting to watch.
Stephen beat me to it. 77 study seems wrong to me. Your 80+% figure of EV shoves has to be weighted against EV we lose if we bust. Also comparing % of hands that have +EV shoves or calls is probably meaningless, we have to compare sums of all EVs of all hands we shove.
enzyne,
I think your points will be easier to understand if you distinguish the times when you're talking within the ICM model from the times you're talking outside of it.
Because I'm measuring the EV of the 77 call within the ICM model, the model naturally takes into account the times we call 77 and lose.
Ben, ICM based analysis of single hand doesn't really consider bust probability and its implications. They can be achieved through some serious mental modeling only.
When you call there is a ~50% chance that tournament ends right here, and upcoming hands won't give you any opportunity to continue making +EV decisions hand after hand. In another 50% of cases you double up and continue tournament in a new scenario - as a big stack where chips flow in your direction.
When you shove bust probability is much lower pretty much always, so by continiously pushing you can accumulate +EV hands one by one and improve your tournament result.
This dynamic is pretty much outside of ICM single-handed scope, but it has to be considered when you are contemplating a ~0% EV call.
For example, in HU sng if opponent pushes first hand and you make a slightly +EV call, tournament can end immediately and you will be negative cause of rake being > than +EV call you made. So you can choose to pass some scenarios which have high probability of bust scenario in order to even have a chance to accumulate enough +EV decisions during tournament to beat rake.
Right, but irrespective of the EV you are analysing the future implications of the call under the assumption we win every time, no?
Stephen,
"Right, but irrespective of the EV you are analysing the future implications of the call under the assumption we win every time, no?"
Yes, but it doesn't matter. Just imagine for a second we're playing an imaginary poker game where position doesn't matter (like stud, with its ante/bring structure). In this imaginary game we know calling in hand A is worth 0. If we fold we get X% +$EV plays on hand B, and if we call we get some additional number of +$EV plays on hand B. So we should call in hand A.
The blind structure complicates things slightly and forces us to weight positional considerations against stack considerations, but it's useful (for me at least) to separate these two points in theory.
Hey Ben are you going to do a review of your recent deep run?
vulture,
I recorded some of the play at the final table, I'm going to go over that footage.
Dear Ben.
There is no need for such distinction. When we talk about frequency of +EV shoves, we naturally mean ICM, that's how we calculate EV.
I think you are wrong in assuming "ICM ignorance of our changing stack size". In fact, stack size is the only thing ICM is taking in consideration. In other words, when we "gamble" and double up, our probability to finish first goes up, and probability of our opponents to finish first goes down, so ICM does take next hand in consideration in that regard. The changing of stacks as a result of all in is the main reason we have more +ICM EV shoves if we win.
My point is, when you calculate ICM EV, you have already taken into account the possibility of doubling up/crippling your opponent.
Also, your implication that
EV(subsequent hands if we win) - EV(we lose if we bust) > EV(subsequent hands if we fold now)
is completely not obvious. In fact, I think if we calculate EV using ICM they are equal. (or, strictly speaking, - 0.04 of prize pool in your example)
Sorry, I think we're talking past each other. I'm pretty sure my argument is taking into account the stuff you don't think it is.
Getting walked through ICM like by a motor protein:
GameTheory what the heck is that?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinesin
Hey Sauce,
Love all the videos that you upload.
Could you please recommend your favorite 3 poker books in order please?
What do you think about Application of poker by Mat Janda?
Sauce opinion on it. One of the reasons I bought it was this "foreword" from him. No regrets, amazing book,
Running your simulations with Future Games Simulations (FGS) added and computing SB's calling range:
ICM only (reproducing your result): 8.3%, 88+ A9s+ ATo+
Adding FGS (looking 6 hands ahead): 9.4%, 77+ A8s+ ATo+ KQs
Conclusion: FGS supports your conclusion :-)
zen, don't have HRC now but from Sauce example we shouldn't be looking into only 1 future hand ? What is the result ?
Raphael:
I used 6 future hands in the FGS simulations. The most I could use before calculations became too heavy. My computer is a beast, but trying 9 hands choked it. :-)
Here's ICM for vegans:
tks
Hey Ben,
Really good video! Made me think about situations where I should be gambling or folding. Think a large part of it depends on the edge we have on our opponents, or the edge they have on us. If I am against two RIO pros I will gamble and call with 77s, against two cardrunner pros I will fold there, since I have a huge edge.
"Raise KJos in CO". How can we figure out if this is a profitable play or not? Usually I will just look at villian's "fold to LP %" "vpip" and make my decision off that. How can I make a better decision using a holdem resource? Is the tool called "Holdem resources model"?
I'll be working with HEMRcalc during the final table review, but I won't be giving a tutorial on how to use it.
Would really like to see a complete review of your 10k run!
Awesome video, ty sauce
Thanks Luke !
Responding to Stevie and other's saying Ben isn't considering the times we bust.
Calling 77 is neutral EV according to ICM or more formally
A weighted average of ICMV( call and lose ) + ICMV(Call and chop) + ICMV(Call and win) = 0
Sauce's variation on the model is holds everything the same, except term 3 becomes larger because we can shove 85% OTB the next hand.
So the EV of calling 77
A weighted average of ICM(V call and lose ) + ICMV(Call and chop) + ICMV(Call and win) + PrizepoolEV of having a big stack > 0
This is a good video and really gets to why modelling these situations are really tough and unfortunately for tournament players is often something they must attempt to while they are playing the highest stakes they usually play.
I think Ben outlined why we should call 77 vs that BTN shoving range, but it's a constant balancing act because if we call 77 BTN should shove a little tighter and then we need to call tighter. Especially because if we can only play 8% of hands vs. a shove we likely have a substantial CEV loss rate. Given that stack sizes remain similarly distributed the $EV of folding isn't the $EV of our stack after folding but the $EV of our stack minus our expected loss rate times the number of hands we expect to play at this stack size.
Sam,
Thanks a lot for laying it out like that, well done. (and making my life a lot easier :)
My whole point was that
ICMV(call and win) + PrizepoolEV of having a big stack = ICMV(call and win)
or at least very close to it. But suppose i'm wrong, and PrizepoolEV >0, and we do gain EV in subsequent hands. In that case you have to compare
A) ICM(V call and lose ) + ICMV(Call and chop) + ICMV(Call and win) + PrizepoolEV of having a big stack
and
B) ICM(folding 77) + PrizepoolEV of having our old stack.
Only once you establish that A > B, you can say that calling 77 is better than folding.
Thanks for putting it in those words that make it a lot easier to understand, I was having trouble agreeing with what Ben was saying and really siding on Stephens side with the idea that he wasnt accounting for the times we bust. This does leave me wondering though, does this mean that everytime we are put in a neutral EV spot we should always go with it (using this particular 3 handed example)? If not, could you please give an example using these parameters. Thank you
Theories,
"Thanks for putting it in those words that make it a lot easier to understand, I was having trouble agreeing with what Ben was saying and really siding on Stephens side with the idea that he wasnt accounting for the times we bust. This does leave me wondering though, does this mean that everytime we are put in a neutral EV spot we should always go with it (using this particular 3 handed example)? If not, could you please give an example using these parameters. Thank you"
The answer depends on what you mean by the bolded bit. If by "neutral EV spot" you mean a spot that an ICM model like HRC defines as prize pool neutral, then probably yes.
Sam,
"Given that stack sizes remain similarly distributed the $EV of folding isn't the $EV of our stack after folding but the $EV of our stack minus our expected loss rate times the number of hands we expect to play at this stack size."
Agreed. Although, it's very difficult to model the expected number of hands we get at this stack distribution, as well as other similarly bad -CEV stack distributions. Because it's so hard to model the stack implications of future hands, I think it's better to default to what people's goals seem to be with their stacksize and tournament life. Statements like "he's trying to move up the ladder" or "he's playing for the win" or any of the gradations between them actually make a lot of sense in this context and figuring out people's intentions can help us fill in the gaps in our models (which typically only work in a vacuum, or over a small number of hands).
Maybe your life is easier, my brain is experiencing technical difficulties on last sentence
Given that stack sizes remain similarly distributed the $EV of folding isn't the $EV of our stack after folding but the $EV of our stack minus our expected loss rate times the number of hands we expect to play at this stack size.
:SPS /All rest is perfect tho :)) i just gave trouble / difficulty understanding exactly last sentence
I think something your 77 example is ignoring is Bust Probability - two hands with equal ICMadjusted-$EV values can have different probabilities of busting.
As an example I'm looking at an SB call vs BTN shove situation and both A8s and KQs have identical ICM-$EV of -0.21 but the probability of bust is 47.06% and 49.75% respectively.
I believe the factor to consider is the POB - and that happens to track closely with ICM$EV but that's just a lucky coincidence for your purposes.
You can use ICMIZER [XX detailed result] button (in the Result tab) to see the POB of a given hand.
I could very well be wrong. What do you think?
Edit: just realized this doesn't work for when we can't bust (have stack covered) - so what I said must be wrong - but POB still must be a factor.
I think you are correct. The real question, how exactly to consider POB in such scenario. If we win, we get a lot of push possibilities with low bust probability. If we fold, we continue to get pushed at and at some point we will have to make a call with high bust probability.
Soo.. why not now? If we wait a few hands, our double up will get us back to medium stack and won't grant us chances to make +EV pushes with low bust probability as big stack, thats for sure.
I wrote an article about related problem here: http://www.icmpoker.com/en/articles/icm-poker-and-ultimate-difference-between-call-and-push-spots/Sam/Ben,
I am not sure I fully understand everything you're saying but I think I get the gist. My issue is that you are looking at an $EV problem through a cEV lens and ignoring the fact that in the 2nd hand folding the button is going to be inherently +$EV...we don't have to be shoving to gain equity in the hand and in fact if we isolate the second hand we have a greater increase in prize pool equity in the 9bb/12bb/7bb scenario than we do in the 18bb/3bb/7bb one. I think using our shove range as a barometer for our future profitability is a misleading oversimplification.
can you elaborate on this?
Pretty please make a non satty SNG vid with your views on them :)
Stephen,
I definitely agree that folding OTB (in a non ante structure) is going to be +$EV for the same reasons you do.
Like I said in my prior post, I was just doing a thought experiment to show that ICM is self contradictory if we compare it against itself over multiple hands. I'm definitely not making precise recommendations about optimal play (optimal here meaning in a broader than ICM context) in the sng spots I was describing. For instance, I still don't know whether calling 77 is optimal in the toy sng I described in the video, but I do think the example shows that if our opponents are playing ICM then it's likely a call.
It's funny, HRC doesn't show the $EV of folding- it just shows how +$EV it is to call or raise. So the ICM models don't allows us to quantify the opportunity cost (relative to folding) of making really thin +$EV jams or calls. Thanks for pointing this out, and it's another reason why our current models aren't as accurate as we'd like.
Ben,
ICMIZER does show $EV of folding - and both use $EV_fold to find the results they give.
If you get a result of +0.03 that is it's EV compared to folding.
Thanks for clarifying that point.
Nice video. Looking forward to seeing the tournament footage.
"Chips we lose are more valuable than chips we win". This makes intuitive sense for the early or middle stages of a tournament and for playing with a short stack. Does this still hold true when winning includes both gaining chips and moving up in the prize structure? For example, at the final table of an MTT with four players remaining and a big stack (100bb) vs short stack (10bb) confrontation, does the big stack still lose more and win less?
Unless there is some anomality in payout structure this statement usually holds true. But of course, if someone has 1 chip and if you bust him from tournament your minimal payout increases, winning this 1 chip from this particular player is very valuable and losing 1 chip to another player is not so valuable.
So busting a player with stack of X chips is not the same as winning X chips from big stack, for example.
Usually, yes. Take for example an MTT structure fairly early in the money. Maybe 10% of the prize pool will have been payed out for mincashes already, so the chips we win don't sum to the value of the full prizepool, and so they're worth less.
Hello Ben,
What do you think about limping in early positions with the whole range that you play as the medium stack in a FT?
It looks like a great idea to reduce playing big pots and reducing ICM confrontations.
You probably know about a player called excentric which limps in all early positions and has a good winrate on those.
Thanks!
Limping is a fine strategy, but it won't reduce ICM confrontations. It will just reduce the size of the pot relative to raising.
Thanks for the answer Ben!
Yes, the think is that by playing smaller pots we put less chips in the pot in average and this is important in a FT. I am talking with an average stack of 40bb or so.
By limping we don't let the oponents that CC with position (BTN, CO, MP) put presure on us by betting often with position and apply pressure to us since we will play with much bigger SPR (stack per pot ratio). (We are going to have to check-fold the flop often in this situation, which will occur often).
You have to take in count that when our stack gets down from 20-25bb (when he would bet turn/river) our BF is huge and we would have to fold very often.
Question 2: Besides of that, do you think the EV of limping in EP-MP has similar EV to Open Raising in a normal tournament or cash scenario? (without ICM considerations)
Interesting that you bring this up. Usually people that limp are thought to be weak players or fishes. It seems some people have been changing their views and limping is a viable strategy.
I'm hesitant to pursue this topic further here because I find myself disagreeing with how you're framing the discussion. Limping isn't a magic bullet, it's just a cheaper way to put money in the pot. It isn't better or worse (either CEV-wise or ICM-wise) than raising. I think limping can be a strong choice either as a pure or mixed strategy, especially from EP and MP, and especially as the antes get larger.
Interesting topic.
Ben, do you think in a FT where do you have a huge edge with a lot of weak players it would be better to limp in general than to raise first in? This makes the pots size smaller and pays out more your postflop skills (where you are much better than then).
Just wondering if your 10K "run" was on your treadmill desk as well:)
Hi Ben, Thank you for a wonderful video which I am continuing to digest. I come from a different background than your average ROI subscriber I think, as I am substantially older and play live tournaments largely (as well as cash). I have a question regarding the fields I typically play against, which I believe to be largely ICM naive in my experience. In these situations, assuming your theoretical example where we are the chip leader, should our button shoving ranges be closer to CEV ranges as opposed to ICM ranges? As you mention, it is a disaster to get called as a chip leader in this case, but we shove wider because we are protected by SB, and BB's tight calling ranges. With the opponents I face in these situations being less aware of ICM considerations and perhaps more likely to call, does this erode my level of protection?
Thanks again, and forgive me if this is elementary, but I very much enjoy your videos.
I think in your ICM-naive fields (where players are playing too close to CEV when ICM considerations are important) the right adjustment is to play even tighter than ICM suggests. Suppose folding has a +EV of some amount in ICM play, well, if your opponents are shoving and calling much looser then that +EV from folding increases, and it takes a larger +EV to enter the pot (or to put it differently, the opportunity cost of entering pots increases when your opponents are naive about ICM).
Hey Ben - cool vid. I'm strictly a cash player, and had the same question as Jeff when looking at your examples.
Okay, so clearly we should open less than ICM suggests against players who call too much. How do we quantify this, though? (i.e. in the example where we open 42%, and the blinds can only call 8% according to ICM- let's say one is calling 10%, and the other 35%, or whatever- what's the best way to go about figuring out exactly how much we should loosen up our range- or at least to improve our estimate of this?
Very interesting video!
In the 77 example it seems very intuitive that calling would be better although FoldEV next hand is not 0 and being able to play higher vpip doesnt mean more $, like in sats there are spots where is optimal for big stack to shove any2 but this doesnt rly increasy his $ev
(it was ask before but still) Do you think/let`s say on a final table/ given stack sizes we could vary our preflop strategy in some spots by like only limping/only 2x/ only >2.5x ? I think in theory it should be relevant even to our flop cbet strategy (for example). Another thing is betsizing on the river - lets say u r the smaller stack and pot is big compared to stack and the spot is such as that in a cash game ur sizing should be all in but now if u go all in as the shorter stack on FT (it seems to me) u should have less bluff than in a cash game and villain should be overfolding to some extend to make the equilibrium(so less ev, so smaller betsizing could be better)./but then 'the caller' should be making -ev calls?/ (and the opposite - if u are the bigger stack u could have more bluffs than in a cash game- /no contradiction here/)
?
Thanks for the comment, and I'm glad the video got you thinking about these topics. Because of your English I'm not 100% clear on your post, but I think I'm following you. I'm going to summarize your points first just to be sure I'm understanding you. It seems like you've made what I think are a couple very important points.
@your 77 point. In the 77 hand it seems clear that the additional shoves contribute substantially to the big stack's EV. HRC highlights the shoves in green, and they seem to be distributed gradually from near neutral EV to fairly +EV, depending on the strength of the jammer's hand both AI and as blockers to calling ranges. It seems like when you sum all of the additional hands button gets to shove when he's the bigstack that the cumulative effect of all the shoves is going to be large. It would be interesting to see this effect quantified though, and I haven't done it yet. Intuitively though, it seems like a very large effect.
@your postflop ICM points. If I'm taking your meaning here, you're arguing that ICM doesn't just effect the preflop equilibrium, it continues to effect the postflop equilibrium. Specifically, the bettor gets to either a) bluff more than CEV equilibrium, b) the caller calls less than CEV equilibrium, or c) some combinations of both. My guess is that the answer here is (c), that when ICM considerations are in play, the guy doing the betting bluffs a little more often than CEV and the caller calls a little less.
Ok, so let's compare an ICM toygame to a CEV toygame in order to formalize this hypothesis a bit (throughout this part, numbers with a $ before them are prize pool numbers and unadorned numbers are chips). What we'll need is a prize structure and some stacks in order to model the ICM part, and we'll need a simple CEV situation in order to model the CEV equilibrium. So let's suppose then that we're 3 handed with prizes $3/$2/$1 and stacks are 15/15/15, and we arrive hu on the river in a polarized nuts or air situation with a potsize of 10 and effective stacks of 10. The CEV solution is for the bettor to bet his bluffs and half his air, and his EV is .75 of the pot, and for the caller to call half of his bluffcatchers. It seems like either player can unilaterally increase their EV in the ICM case: the caller by folding all the time and the bettor by either never bluffing or always bluffing. But let's test this idea first. Suppose the bluffer bets pot, half the time he busts and wins $1, and the other half the time he wins 10 for a stack of 20. His $EV prior to the hand is $2. If he bluffs and wins then his EV after the hand (according to ICMizer) is $2.23, and he has 44% of the chips in play. We can compare his fraction of the prize pool to his fraction of the total chips, in this case his fraction of the pool is 2.23/6 or 37%, which is only 84% as valuable as the CEV of 44%. Or, in other words, for his call to be "equal" to CEV, it has to be worth .44/.37, or 119% of CEV. In this case the pot is 10, so his call needs to have an EV of >= to .19(10) or around 1.9 out of the 10 pot (I think?).<--- This last move seems kinda sketchy to me, but I'm about to go to sleep and I can't be bothered to fix it up right now, someone let me know what I did wrong later :)
If that's right (in principle if not in execution) we can probably solve for thresholds for bluff success for the bettor and then come to an ICM adjusted equilibrium. Because of the inadequacies with the ICM model I don't really think it's necessary for me to follow this train of thought all the way to a workable model (although if someone does want to explore this it'd be interesting to see the results!), but I think this thought experiment works as a sketch of how the equilibria in ICM spots get wacky compared with CEV.
So... how to use this information ? I donno, that's another video or three.
I fully agree with your points. I was thinking the same thing about the bluff success threshhold( havent looked the exact numbers tho).
But also i have 1 more point- if it is true that icm affects different stack sizes in a diff.way (mb thats an illusion) there will be some spots where there is no/strange equilibrium.
Let`s say- 3 players, stacks A-50chips /B-15/C-15 (prizepool 3/2/1) and hand is between players A and C and pot on the river is 10 (C has 10 left) and C is with polarized range. So, to shove on bluff he risks tournament chips and busting so A could overfold. This means C could bluff more and normally(!) there would be equilibrium when C should bluff X% and A should call Y%.
X1 over 33%
Y1 under 50%
But mb A(reasons-even if he loses he is chipleader and some intuitive things like this) is less affected from icm than C, so he would start making some +chipEV calls that are ok in$EV for him but will make C' bluff losing $EV(for C).
So the equilibrium would be connected to:
X1 / Y1 = Z1 X2 / Y2 = Z2
Z1 > Z2
So this would decrease shortstack's EV (in general in this spot) compared to cash game model or ICM with equal stacks model even when he is the bettor.
Is that true or im dellusioning myself? :)
2D,
Your argument makes perfect sense to me. There's a similar effect reflected in the HRC outputs I look at in following videos (although these only work for preflop). I compared a raise/fold tree without ICM to a raise/fold tree with ICM (and in the ICM tree I inputted the stacks and positions from hand 1 of my tournament review where I'm the big stack in the CO), and the equilibrium reflects the fact that the big stack can overbluff by opening much more often and 3betting much more often than the other players, and the once the big stack has VPIP-ed or failed to VPIP the other player's play changes a lot.
I'll definitely check out this effect in a later part of the final table review, I think it should show up in the HRC calculations. We can find the effect's magnitude by looking at an ICM sim where Z1>Z2 and comparing it to one where Z2>Z1. I was also informed that CREV has a tournament mode which might take these ICM adjusted equilibria into effect for hu pots.
hi,
got a questions about FGS, so ill post it here. Imagine table of 5 players with 3 itm spots, all stacks are almost even. Small blind jams and we're on the BB. Now the Qs:
1) If we call and win, we're gonna have massive winrate, right?
2) Does FGS consider this and then widens our calling range in the 5 player bvb situation?
Sorry, I don't know much about FGS yet.
For some explanation of FGS:
FGS (Future Game Simulations) Calculations Explained
Interview with HoldemResources Calculator Inventor Helmuth Melcher
I'd say it depends on the size of blinds and average stacks? As I understand it, FGS takes into account the next (or next few) hands of play. If the blinds are still a small percentage of stacks, people aren't really going to be jamming/calling off wide. The higher the blinds, the more stacks should be going in the next hands and so the more FGS should be considered.
I'd seriously suggest toying around with FGS on Icmizer with different stack sizes for the example in your question. You'll get more out of that than any general answers people can give you. The real question is exactly how much should you be widening your range in that spot and that obviously depends on your opponent's jamming range and the blinds/stack sizes, and how will people be playing in the next few hands.
Yes it does. Depending how deep you run the situation in FGS this effect will trickle down towards your original callrange going wider and wider
also @zenfish, did you put in same btn openjam ranges for ICM and FGS for the sake of the argument? because hrc automaticlly finds the equilibrium doesnt it?
I added FGS to the equilibrium calculation and posted the new SB calling range. I did not freeze the BTN range, although you can.
Sorry to be the dim kid in the class and to take the discussion back to fundamentals with this question:
Whenever I read or hear something about ICM I'm always told that chips we lose are worth more than chips we gain. How can that be the case if ICM attempts to put a value on each chip in play and in the situation where I lose a pot but am not eliminated the total number of chips in play remains the same?
Thanks for your patience.
I'm not sure how to answer your question in a clearer way than I've already tried to present this information in the video. I do think this is a tricky concept though, and I'm not sure I understand it fully either.
I think it might be clearer if you just do an example on your own, similar to the one I had in the video. It's probably easier to just do the math than to explain.
I am on board with every part of the video, Ben. Great job!
Its an elite video? o_O
I might be delusional but who grinds MTTs for life and did not know all that before?
Hi Ben
Thanks for your response. I've been having a think about the question I asked and I might have already figured it out (please confirm if you think I have got it right): ICM doesn't attempt to assign a value to each chip - it attempts to assign a value to your stack. Therefore you can lose chips in a pot and lose value from your stack but not in proportion to the number of chips lost. e.g. if you are in last place in a tournament, but already in the money, and lose 20% of your stack, the value of your stack doesn't diminish by 20%.
Have I got it right?
All the best
Ben
Hey Ben- you got it
Hi,
I believe there is another approximation in the ICM model, it's that the frequency of finishing at a given position is considered to be independent of the prize structure.
For example, if I'm the only shortstack of the table at the bubble, I will finish last more often than at a winner takes all tournament with similar stack sizes; because in the first case it is the correct play for the other players to wait for me to bust before fighting each other. But in the ICM calculations I have the same chances of finishing last in both cases, since this is calculated only based on stack sizes. If this was properly taken into account by the model it could change the results quite a bit... Am I wrong?
Miam,
I think your argument is right, but I think the approximation you're talking about is the same, or closely related to, the ones that I talked about in the video. In other words, you're saying correct strategy leads to different finish % then the ICM model predicts so it's incomplete, and I'm describing some of the strategy changes that must be correct if the ICM model is right but if those changes are right then the ICM model is wrong.
Great video Ben.
You addressed the limitations of ICM perfectly.
One assumption (that you highlighted) is that ICM assumes your opponents are calling correctly according to ICM. This seems to be brushed over rather swiftly by most discussions on ICM that I have seen. I believe it should play a far bigger part in one's decision making process.
At mid-stakes, where I play, it is fair to say that a very decent proportion of players aren't doing this. So in your shallow stack 3 handed example (a situation that will b every familiar to most players, particularly in turbos). Given the huge advantage having 12x vs 7x and 8x is I think it is incorrect to be shoving the 80 odd % on the BTN that ICM tells us we should be. Obviously this all depend on your reads of your opponents' goals and understanding of the game.
While my explanation wont be anywhere near as clear as yours are; this leads me, in general, to be tighter than ICM when shoving with CL at stacks this shallow.
Does this make sense?
Cmw,
Hold em Resources Calculator has a utility that lets you define your opponent's shoving ranges and then finds the correct strategy to maximize $EV. It sounds like this tool might help you take better advantage of your opponent's play.
In the 77 example, isn't the problem really with the algorithm we're using and it's possible that if we used an ICM algorithm that gave a higher frequency of the big stack finishing first compared to Mason-Harville, that we could call with 77, because we would be less concerned about busting third than we would be in Mason-Harville?
I think this kind of argument is circular. Sure, there exists some algorithm that could output really accurate results, but the devil is in the details :p
Well, you seem to be assuming that Mason-Harville doesn't give sufficient weight to the advantage of having a big stack. I don't know why I should be convinced that 77's a clear call here just because it's on the border of being $EV according to this model. Yes, there is value in doubling up and Mason-Harville just like any other ICM model takes that into account because larger stacks have higher $EV. You seem to be suggesting that there is an inherent problem with ICM because it cannot take into account things like big stack bully advantage whereas empirically if we can prove that folding 77 here is bad, we would need to tinker with the algorithm to assign greater first place finish frequency to largest stack.
Well, you seem to be assuming that Mason-Harville doesn't give sufficient weight to the advantage of having a big stack. I don't know why I should be convinced that 77's a clear call here just because it's on the border of being $EV according to this model. Yes, there is value in doubling up and Mason-Harville just like any other ICM model takes that into account because larger stacks have higher $EV. You seem to be suggesting that there is an inherent problem with ICM because it cannot take into account things like big stack bully advantage whereas empirically if we can prove that folding 77 here is bad, we would need to tinker with the algorithm to assign greater first place finish frequency to largest stack.
I don't know if I understood you correctly but You seem to say thay you have to be more loose than Malmuth-Harville model predicts when calling All inns, but when you are the big stack this is probably not true, because by winning you not change you're expected EV gain of shoving future hand much and when you loose you're diminishing substantially the expectation of shoving future hands.
Shouldn't the input for the SB in the "didn't take the gamble with 77" slide be 11.5 and not 8.5? I would assume that if i'm correct would change what your shove range should be.
[How] does this account for the times that we fold and in a subsequent hand the other short stack busts? We would not have been alive to increase our payout had we called and lost.
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